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The quantity and character of internal migration in the American past is a contentious historiographical issue. Over a century ago, Frederic Jackson Turner pointed to westward migration as a "safety valve" that profoundly affected the nature of the republic. With the closing of the frontier, Turner predicted that the population flow to the West would decline. Turner's twentieth-century critics argued that the greatest American population movement was not westward expansion, but rather urbanization, which accelerated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Beginning in the 1960s, social historians using new quantitative approaches fleshed out the critique of Turner, arguing that high migration to and between urban areas in the nineteenth century did not result in improved economic opportunity.
This article uses new evidence to reevaluate internal migration in the American past. Our three major findings are consistent with Turner's interpretation. First, we identify a U-shaped pattern of change: the nineteenth century had the highest overall levels of migration, followed by a decline in the first half of the twentieth century and a resurgence after World War II. Thus, by the time Turner wrote about the closing of the frontier, a dramatic decline in mobility was already underway. The highest mobility in American history occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century, and there was a steady decline in interstate mobility until well into the twentieth century. Second, we show that the high levels of nineteenth century migration resulted from long-distance westward migration to farms, whereas the high migration of the late twentieth century can be ascribed to white suburbanization and black migration to northern cities. Finally, we look briefly at the relationship between geographic mobility and social mobility, and find evidence suggesting that migration may have improved economic opportunity.
Migration and American History
In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville devoted an entire chapter to explaining "why the Americans are so restless in the midst of their prosperity."
1 The high mobility of nineteenth century Americans was widely remarked upon, and it was usually explained in terms of the plentiful availability of land. Joseph Kennedy, superintendent of the census of 1850, regarded high migration as an "unfavorable trait in our national character." But Kennedy predicted that the mobility would not last: once the plains had been settled and the cheap land was gone, we would settle down and "the inhabitants of each state would become comparatively stationary." 2 Four decades later, Fredrick Jackson Turner began his famous essay by quoting another superintendent of the census. Because of the settlement of the interior, the 1890 census showed for the first time that the frontier line no longer existed. Turner argued that "movement has been [the] dominant fact" of the American past, but the era of westward expansion was ending: "…the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history." 3 Turner's frontier thesis included four specific hypotheses about the migration process: first, the nineteenth century was the greatest period of migration in American history; second, the magnet for migration was the economic opportunity offered by the availability of agricultural land in the ever-moving western frontier; third, these agricultural opportunities provided a hopeful alternative for the surplus labor supply crowding the urban centers of the east; and finally, with the closing of the frontier, American migration would lose its force. Turner's critics challenged these four hypotheses. They argued that movement to the frontier was only the first major migration stream in American history-important but neither the largest nor the most significant. Movement out of rural areas into towns and cities, already beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, was economically more important and demographically more powerful. Soon after Turner's dramatic pronouncement about the frontier, scholars were documenting the role of migration in the burgeoning American cities. 5 Economic opportunity awaited in the country's urban industrial centers. Turner's interpretation of the west-as-safety-valve was turned on its head: according to the new interpretation, the cities were absorbing surplus farm labor.
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The new migration centered on urban economic opportunity and its growth engine was cheap automobiles, not cheap land.
The available statistics seemed to support the interpretation that movement to cities was more important than westward migration. Already by 1870, eight American cities reported that out-of-state migrants constituted more than a fourth of their nativeborn population. Even in the west, the 1900 census showed that fewer than half the population lived on farms. By 1920 the trend was clear; more Americans lived in cities than in rural areas.
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By the mid-twentieth century, the crude census statistics on interstate movement then available suggested that migration was at an all-time high. Since 1850, the census has inquired about the state of birth and state of residence of each individual in the population. For each succeeding decade, the Census has published sufficient information to calculate the percentage of native-born persons who were interstate migrants. These statistics are given in Figure 1 . There was a slight decline in the percentage of interstate migrants between 1870 and 1900 followed by a dramatic increase over the course of the twentieth century. This pattern supported the view of those scholars who argued that twentieth-century urbanization was a more important migration stream than nineteenthcentury westward expansion. A different picture emerged when historians began to use the manuscript censuses to trace social and geographic mobility in nineteenth century communities. These investigators attempted to link individuals from one census to the next, and found that the great majority simply disappeared from the community. The extraordinary population turnover implied by these analyses was one of the core findings of the new social history.
The earliest studies focused on frontier areas, and generally seemed consistent with
Turner's interpretation: not only did two-thirds to three-fourths of working age men disappear in each decade between 1850 and 1880, but newcomers usually experienced upward economic mobility.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, historians began to apply the same techniques to urban areas, and found similar rates of disappearance. 10 The urban studies, however, suggested less upward social mobility than did the frontier analyses. Stephan Thernstom, in particular, challenged Turner's interpretation that migration was a safety valve. He disputed the contention that working-class emigrants from eastern cities were drawn to better economic opportunity on the agricultural frontier. Rather, he maintained, these workers formed a "floating" labor force of "permanent transients," "buffeted about from city to city within the New England labor market." whites. In the censuses of 1950 to 1960, when white interstate migration was comparatively low, black migration was higher than at any previous census. In the past two decades, however, the percentage of black migrants has dropped significantly, and is now lower than the percentage of white migrants.
When assessing the chronological pattern of migration, it is important to bear in mind that these are dates of the census, not the dates in which the migration actually occurred. Census data show that the peak ages of interstate migration are the twenties and thirties, so most of the migration shown in Figure 2 probably occurred several decades before the date of each census. 17 For whites, therefore, migration probably began to decline around the Civil War, reached a low point from World War I through the depression, and began to rise after World War II. For blacks, the high migration reflected in the 1870 and 1880 censuses occurred mainly before the Civil War and was primarily movement of slaves, whereas the high migration of the recent period corresponds to the great northward migration of blacks between 1915 and 1970.
The data unequivocally support the contention of Thernstrom, Knights, Katz, and others that the nineteenth century was a period of extraordinarily high population movement. They are also consistent with Turner's prediction that the closing of the frontier would lead to a decline in mobility. Indeed, among whites aged 50 to59, the proportion of migrants was 41 percent greater in 1850 than in 1940. By 2000, the proportion of white migrants had recovered, but it remained 12 percent lower than in the mid-nineteenth century.
Figure 3 breaks the results down by sex. As predicted by some migration theorists, among whites there was a long-run decline in the gender gap in migration: in the early censuses, males were fourteen to nineteen percent more likely to have migrated than were females, but this difference gradually diminished over time and virtually disappeared after 1950. 18 Among blacks, however, female migration was lower than male migration in all periods, but there is no consistent chronological trend.
[ Figure 3 about here.]
Migration flows and destinations
It is clear that the nineteenth century was a period of extraordinary interstate migration for whites, but did this reflect agricultural settlement on the western frontier or movement to and between cities? To address this question, we first need to investigate migration flows. To assess flows, we calculated movements between and within each of five regions: the Northeast, Southeast, North Central, South Central, and West. The regions are identified in Figure 4 . Where flows were consistently small-such as West to Northeast-we aggregated them into larger groupings to make the patterns easier to interpret.
[ Figure 4 -map of census regions about here].
Figures 5 and 6 describe the migration flows for blacks and whites, respectively.
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These are area graphs; the width of each band in each census year reflects the percentage of persons aged 50-59 who had migrated along the indicated path. As shown in Figure 5 , the very high interstate migration of early nineteenth century whites was primarily longdistance movement westward from the east coast states, especially from the Northeast region to the North Central Region. As the eastern part of the North Central region began to fill up in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a second wave of westward movement within the North Central region, from states like Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana into rapidly growing farm states such as Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.
Were it not for these dramatic movements to and within the Midwest, nineteenth century migration would have been considerably lower that of the twentieth century. The other tail of the U-the rise in white migration after World War II-was broadly based, but was led by southward migration from the North Central and Northeastern regions.
[ Migration to the central part of the country dominated interstate population movements in the mid-nineteenth century among both blacks and whites; the principal differences were that black migration in that period was usually involuntary and the primary destination was the South Central region rather than the North Central region. In the twentieth century, blacks headed for northern destinations and whites were increasingly likely to move south. Thus, the superficial similarity of the U-shaped migration trends among whites and blacks masks substantial differences in their destinations and motivations for moving.
We can also assess the type of destinations of migrants. In Figures 
Social mobility and migration selectivity
The Thernstrom hypothesis that the high migration of the nineteenth century reflected a floating proletariat moving from town to town in search of work gets little support from the new census data. As we have seen, most white migrants in the midnineteenth century went to farms, and most black migrants apparently moved as slaves.
In addition, however, the census reveals that the group of male migrants who were not farmers generally included a greater percentage of men in higher status occupations than did the group of non-migrant non-farmers who remained behind. Figures 9 and 10 show the percent migrant by occupational status for employed male non-farmers. In all periods for both whites and blacks, white collar workers were more likely to have moved across state lines than were skilled or unskilled workers, and the differences were particularly pronounced in the nineteenth century. One of the most potent criticisms the safety-valve thesis was that the poor lacked sufficient resources to move West and establish a farm; even when land was inexpensive or free, it took money to travel west and purchase the equipment and supplies needed to farm. 24 Thus, according to this argument, migration was concentrated among those who were already doing well. Although our data cannot tell us how much money migrants had with past research on migration selectivity: those with the least education were least likely to move. 25 By contrast, before 1870-the period when westward migration to farms was at its peak-illiterate whites were substantially more likely to have migrated than were persons who could read and write. These data do not tell us whether the very high mobility of the illiterate in the early nineteenth century was associated with upward economic mobility; the results therefore could be consistent with either the safety valve hypothesis or Thernstom's interpretation. The data do, however, clearly reveal a precipitous drop in the mobility of the poorly educated among both whites and blacks during the latter part of the nineteenth century, suggesting a fundamental shift in the relationship of socioeconomic status to migration.
[ Figures 11 and 12 around here]
Cross-sectional sources like the IPUMS cannot resolve the issue of the relationship between geographic mobility and economic mobility, since they do not reveal the occupations or wealth of migrants before they left home. New nationally representative linked census samples being compiled by Joseph P. Ferrie provide more direct evidence on the relationship between geographic and occupational mobility.
Ferrie's work suggests that nineteenth century urban laborers made up a substantial portion of the westward migration stream, and as a group, those migrants did far better than laborers who stayed in the eastern cities. Ferrie's most recent analysis also indicates that upward social mobility was far more frequent in the United States than in England and Wales. 26 These results are still preliminary, but if confirmed they will provide powerful support for Turner's safety valve interpretation: nineteenth-century westward migration offered an escape for large numbers of urban workers.
Conclusion
Nineteenth-century Americans were extraordinarily mobile. Despite the difficulty of travel, almost half of the population moved across state lines, and most of those migrants moved long distances. The bulk of mid-nineteenth-century migrants moved to the Midwest, and almost nine out of ten went to rural areas. Just as Turner predicted, the closing of the frontier in 1890 led to a dramatic decline in westward migration to rural areas. Among whites, even the lure of the cities could not stem the precipitous decline of mobility; it was not until the rise of the suburbs following the Second World War that interstate migration began to return to its historic levels. For blacks, however, the history of internal migration is sharply different. Free blacks never migrated west to farms in large numbers. The great migration of blacks occurred in the early and mid-twentieth century, dominated by movement from the South to large cities in the Northeast and North Central regions.
Turner's thesis generated one of the great debates in American historiography.
His critics found numerous inconsistencies, and made a plausible case that he exaggerated the significance of the frontier in the development of American character and democratic institutions. On several key empirical points, however, Turner got it right.
The mass movement to the frontier in the nineteenth century was extraordinary, and it is 14 reasonable to infer that a demographic experience of such magnitude would have profound implications for social mobility and political institutions. The metaphor of the safety valve may be appropriate: the availability of Western land probably did increase economic opportunity. Turner's greatest insight, perhaps, was his prediction of the sea change in American migration patterns; the closing of the frontier led to a precipitous decline in westward migration.
Turner did not predict the twentieth recovery of migration. attributable to migration. The Eldridge-Thomas analysis showed little secular trend in net displacement for the white population, and gave no hint that the nineteenth century was a period of especially high migration. These estimates have significant limitations; because they measure displacement, in-migration and out-migration cancel one another out.
Moreover, the measures are highly sensitive to errors in the mortality estimates and changes in the completeness of census enumerations; during the past four decades, our understanding of both mortality and census underenumeration has been substantively 14 The underestimation problems associated with the state of birth/state of residence methodology were thoroughly discussed by Everett Lee and his colleagues in their demographic analysis of internal migration. See Everett S. Lee, Ann Rathner Miller, Carol P. Brainerd and Richard A. Easterlin, Population Redistribution and Economic Growth: United States, 1870-1950. I: Methodological Considerations and Reference Tables (Philadelphia, 1957) , 58-60. ; 5,302 to 6,695; 19,912 to 23,159; 25,862 to 28,997; 30,521 to 34,040; 35,938 to 37,702; and 41,599 21 In 1870 and 1880, more black migrants are classified in rural nonfarm places than on farms, but the great majority were employed as agricultural laborers. It is probable that most of these people were in fact residing on plantations-often in the same quarters they had occupied before abolition-but the census does not provide sufficient information to classify their place of residence as a farm. The list of publications using IPUMS data for analyses of migration out of the South is extensive and includes: James N. Gregory, "The Southern Diaspora and the Urban 
